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ABSTRACT 
 
 
We use proprietary data from a major investment bank to investigate factors associated with 
analysts’  annual  compensation.  We  find  compensation  to  be  positively  related  to  “All-Star” 
recognition, investment-banking contributions, the size of analysts’ portfolios, and whether an 
analyst is identified as a top stock-picker by the Wall Street Journal. We find no evidence that 
compensation is related to earnings forecast accuracy. But consistent with prior studies, we find 
analyst turnover to be related to forecast accuracy, suggesting that analyst forecasting incentives 
are primarily termination-based. Additional analyses indicate that “All-Star” recognition proxies 
for buy-side client votes on analyst research quality used to allocate commissions across banks 
and analysts. Taken as a whole, our evidence is consistent with  analyst compensation being 
designed to reward actions that increase brokerage and investment-banking revenues. To assess 
the generality of our findings, we test the same relations using compensation data from a second 
high-status bank and obtain similar results.  
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1.  Introduction 
Sell-side research plays an important role in modern capital markets. Within the United 
States, most top-tier investment banks spend in excess of one hundred million dollars annually 
on equity research.
1 Institutions and retail investors use equity research to help make investment 
decisions (e.g., Madan, Sobhani, and Bhatia [2003]) and corporations rely on sell -side equity 
analysts to market their securities and boost liquidity (e.g., Krigman, Shaw , and Womack 
[2001]).  
But because of limited access to data on analyst pay, prior studies’ assumptions about 
analyst incentives are largely based on plausible conjectures rather than systematic evidence. 
What little is known about analyst compensation is from the memoirs of former analysts (e.g., 
Reingold and Reingold [2006]) and a handful of stories on the reputed pay and characteristics of 
well-known  outliers  like  Jack  Grubman,  Mary  Meeker,  and  Henry  Blodget  (e.g.,  Gasparino 
[2005]). This paper uses analyst compensation data for the period 1988 to 2005 obtained from a 
prominent integrated investment bank to formally examine analyst compensation and its drivers.
2 
Examining actual analyst compensation data enables us to test the incremental economic and 
statistical significance of investment banking, brokerage, and other factors for analyst pay, and 
thereby deepen our understanding of analysts’ financial incentives.   
Our findings also shed light on the relationship between analyst compensation and the 
two most studied measures of analyst performance, forecast accuracy and stock recommendation 
profitability. Mikhail, Walther, and Willis [1999] and Hong and Kubik [2003] find analyst 
                                                 
1 The Sanford C. Bernstein estimates cited by Francis, Chen, Willis, and Philbrick [2004] imply that annual research budgets at 
the top-8 investment banks averaged between $200 and $300 million during the 2000-2003 period. 
2 Our sample bank is rated as “high status” or “top tier” based on a variety of criteria including the Carter-Manaster ten-tier 
“tombstone” ranks provided in Carter, Dark, and Singh [1998], the size-based categorization provided in Hong, Kubik, and 
Solomon [2000], and Institutional Investor’s annual buy-side polls.      
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forecast accuracy to be associated with job turnover and career prospects, suggesting an 
association with compensation. But Mikhail et al. [1999] and Bradshaw [2008] note that this 
relation is not based on actual evidence and conflicts with practitioner assertions that such factors 
are not considered when making bonus awards.
  
We document several important facts, the first being large, systematic swings in the level 
and skewness  of real  compensation throughout  the 1988-2005 period.  Median compensation 
increased from $397,675 in 1994 to a peak of $1,148,435 in 2001, then declined to $647,500 in 
2005. These ebbs and flows were highly correlated with swings in capital market activity, as 
captured by the Baker and Wurgler [2006] market activity index. The increase in compensation 
skewness was reflected in the ratio of analyst compensation at the 90
th and 10
th percentiles, 
which was 2.6 in 1990, increased to 6.1 in 2000, and had declined to 4.0 by 2005. Variation in 
the  level  and  skewness  of  compensation  over  time  was  driven  almost  exclusively  by  bonus 
awards, which grew from a low of 46% of total compensation in 1990 to 84% in 2002, and had 
dropped to 70% by 2005. Collectively, the evidence indicates that during periods of high market 
activity  and  correspondingly  high  trading  commissions  and  corporate  finance  fees,  a  bank’s 
bonus pool expands, leading to large increases in analyst compensation. But these large increases 
are not shared equally among the bank’s analysts, as pay differentials also expand during “hot” 
markets.  
Second, most of the variation in analyst compensation can be explained by four factors, 
(i) recognition by Institutional Investor (II) as an “All-Star” analyst, (ii) recognition by the Wall 
Street Journal (WSJ) as a star stock-picker, (iii) an analyst’s investment-banking contributions, 
and (iv) the size of an analyst’s portfolio. Pooled regressions that estimate the market level of 
analyst pay based on observable characteristics indicate that, controlling for other hypothesized      
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determinants: II All-Star analysts earn 61% higher compensation than their unrated peers; top 
stock-pickers, as recognized by the WSJ, earn about 23% more than their peers; analysts who 
cover stocks that generate underwriting fees for their banks earn 7% higher pay for each million 
dollars of fees earned; and the cross-sectional elasticity of compensation with respect to portfolio 
size is approximately 0.18.  
To evaluate pay-for-performance sensitivities (i.e., incentives), we follow the guidance in 
Murphy [1985] and estimate analyst-fixed-effect regressions that rely on intra-analyst variation 
in  performance  and  compensation.  These  indicate  that,  controlling  for  other  characteristics: 
gaining  (losing)  II  status  is  associated  with  a  16%  compensation  premium  (penalty); 
gaining/losing “star stock-picker” status in the WSJ is associated with an 11% change in pay; 
covering stocks that generate underwriting fees for the bank is accompanied by 6% higher pay 
for each million dollars of fees earned; and the intra-analyst elasticity of compensation with 
respect to portfolio scale is just under 0.07.  
Third, for the sample firm’s analysts, forecast  accuracy plays an insignificant role in 
determining compensation. Interviews with equity research professionals at eleven large banks 
(including the sample bank) as well as examination of  the sample bank’s 2005 performance 
evaluation  and  development  booklet  support  this  inference.  It  is  unusual  for  large  banks  to 
formally  track  forecast  accuracy  for  compensation  purposes.  But  we  do  find  that  inaccurate 
analysts at the sample bank are more likely to move to lower-status banks or exit I/B/E/S, as 
documented  in  the  analyst  turnover  literature.  “Fired”  analyst-year  observations  had  larger 
forecast errors than other analysts who covered the same stocks and other analysts within the 
sample firm.  Taken as a whole, these findings suggest that forecasting incentives resemble a 
Mirrlees contract. Under a normal range of forecasting outcomes, there is no relation between      
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forecasting  performance  and  annual  compensation  within  banks,  but  extremely  adverse 
forecasting outcomes are associated with increased probability of dismissal.
3    
Fourth, we find that much of the WSJ “star stock-picker” compensation premium appears 
to  reflect  public  recognition,  not  underlying  stock-picking  performance.  Moreover,  the 
association between underlying stock-picking performance and compensation occurs with a one-
year lag, reflecting the timing of the WSJ report. We conclude that stock-picking performance 
affects analyst compensation, but the effect is delayed and only economically significant if it 
boosts an analyst’s visibility. Discussions during our interviews support this inference. Although 
stock-picking  performance  is  commonly  tracked  as  part  of  banks’  analyst  evaluation  and 
development processes, insiders indicated that it generally is not a major determinant of analyst 
compensation. 
Finally, we find that the II compensation premium can be explained by the underlying 
votes  of  institutional  investors  (i.e.,  the  “buy-side”),  which  closely  approximate  the  “broker 
votes”  used  to  allocate  commissions  across  banks  and  analysts.  Controlling  for  institutional 
investors’  votes,  the  relation  between  compensation  and  “All-Star”  rating  in  II  becomes 
economically  and  statistically  insignificant.  In  other  words,  the  association  between 
compensation and II-status does not appear to be attributable to the added visibility associated 
with being assigned star status in II’s October issue.  
Our  findings  are  robust  to  a  battery  of  tests  including  alternative  definitions  of  key 
variables, alternative measurement windows, sample-selection controls, first differencing (i.e., 
“changes”), and replication using data from a second high-status investment bank. Interviews 
with  research  directors  at  other  leading  banks  indicated  remarkable  consistency  in  the 
                                                 
3 See Bolton and Dewatripont [2005] and Christensen and Feltham [2005] for a discussion of Mirrlees contracts and the 
“Mirrlees Problem.”      
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performance metrics used to determine analyst bonus awards, suggesting that our findings are 
likely to hold for other top-tier banks as well.  
We nevertheless caution readers against generalizing our findings to non-representative 
settings.  In particular, it seems highly unlikely that they will apply to lower-status banks or 
brokerage  firms  that  employ  few  if  any  II-ranked  analysts  and  do  not  generate  substantial 
investment banking revenues. We further recognize that the importance of investment banking to 
analyst compensation is likely to diminish following the Global Settlement. But we are unable to 
test this hypothesis given restrictions imposed by our sample firm and the limited number of 
post-settlement observations. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the proprietary and public data 
used in the study.  Section 3 provides summary information on analyst compensation. Section 4 
discusses the hypothesized drivers of analyst compensation. Empirical results are presented in 
Sections 5 and 6.  Section 7 concludes with a discussion of results and suggestions for future 
research. 
 
2.  Data 
The data used in this study were obtained from a proprietary compensation file and five 
publicly available sources: I/B/E/S, CRSP, SDC Platinum, Institutional Investor, and the Wall 
Street Journal. The proprietary compensation file is based on a set of spreadsheets obtained from 
a leading Wall Street investment bank for the years 1988-2005.  The spreadsheets report the 
name,  hire  date,  and  compensation  of  each  of  the  bank’s  analysts.  No  other  variables  are 
contained in these spreadsheets.  
The bank’s senior research staff also provided marked-up photocopies of the research 
director’s  2005  analyst  evaluation  and  development  booklet.  This  booklet  reports  analyst      
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performance in a series of figures and tables that track five broad categories of metrics: analyst 
ratings,  marketing,  portfolio  scale,  research  activity,  and  stock-picking  performance.  Analyst 
ratings  were  based  on  surveys  of  the  bank’s  institutional  sales  force  and  clients.  Marketing 
contributions were measured by the number of one-on-one meetings each analyst held with the 
bank’s buy-side clients (mean = 140.30), and number of corporate marketing events held (mean 
= 8.22) and company visits made (mean = 2.75) by each analyst. The scale of an analyst’s 
portfolio  was  measured  as  the  aggregate  market  capitalization  of  covered  stocks.  Research 
activity proxies included number of forecast revisions, number of initiations, and number of 
notes posted. Stock-picking performance was measured using the annualized return to buy and 
strong-buy recommendations. Although we do not have data on these variables for years prior to 
2005, the bank’s research staff informed us that similar measures were used in prior years.   
The sample company’s annual electronic files contained 609 analyst-year observations 
for the period 1988 to 2005 (an average of 33.8 analysts per year) that overlapped the I/B/E/S 
database. Our primary tests utilize observations from 1994, when the WSJ began rating analysts’ 
stock-picking performance, onward.
4 This sample  includes 401 analyst-year observations (an 
average of 33.4 analysts per year). 
 
3.  Analyst Compensation: 1988-2005  
Descriptive  data  on  analyst  compensation  (in  2005-equivalent  dollars)  for  the  609 
analyst-year observations from the 1988-2005 files are reported in Figures 1–3. The dramatic 
changes in analysts’ real compensation shown in Figure 1 were attributable almost entirely to 
bonus  awards;  median  real  bonuses  grew  from  $177,475  in  1994  to  $940,007  in  2001  and 
                                                 
4 Because the first WSJ report, published in September 1993, was less developed, utilized different eligibility criteria, and 
contained only a subset of the industries covered in later years, we treat 1994 as the first year of the WSJ survey (from 1994 
onward, all WSJ reports were published in June/July). Our results are unchanged if we begin the sample in 1993.      
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declined to $450,000 in 2005 (see Figure 2). In contrast, median real salaries showed small but 
steady declines throughout much of the eighteen-year period, from $244,979 in 1988 to $175,000 
in 2005 (see Figure 2), as modest nominal salary growth was more than offset by inflation. 
Salaries declined from 54% of total compensation in 1990 to 16% in 2002, and grew to 30% in 
2005. 
The large increases in compensation that occurred during the late 1990s were not shared 
equally across the firm’s analysts. As shown in  Figure 1, the variance and skewness  of the 
income distribution increased substantially over the sample period, peaking in 2000-2002. In 
1990, the ratio of analyst pay for the 90
th and 10
th percentiles was 255%. By 2000, this ratio had 
more than doubled to 610%. As bonuses declined from 2002 to 2005, the ratio dipped to 400%. 
Figure 3 shows the time-series variation in compensation to be highly correlated with the 
Baker and Wurgler [2006] market activity index.
5 During periods in which market activity and, 
as a result, trading commissions and corporate finance fees, are high the bank’s bonus pool 
expands,  leading  to  large  increases  in  analyst  compensation.  Moreover,  the  strong  relation 
between these variables between 1988 and 2005, and their simultaneous decline towards the end 
of  our  sample  period,  suggests  that  at  least  some  of  the  post-2002  decrease  in  analyst 
compensation  arises  from  a  general  decline  in  market  activity,  and  thus  cannot  be  solely 
attributed to the Global Settlement. 
 
                                                 
5  The  Baker  and  Wurgler  [2006]  index  captures a  variety  of  market  activity  signals  including  banking-related  (e.g.,  IPO 
volume, first-day IPO returns, and equity-share in new issues) and commission-related (e.g., average monthly turnover on NYSE-
listed stocks) variables.      
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4.  Drivers of Compensation  
In this section, we draw on results from the human capital acquisition, job assignment, and 
principal agent (i.e., incentive contracting) literatures to categorize the determinants of analyst 
compensation.
6 Traditional models of human capital acquisition and job assignment (e.g., Mayer 
[1960], Becker [1964], and Rosen [1982]) predict that compensation will be increasing in 
experience and the value of assets under an employee’s control. These predictions follow from 
three assumptions, (i) productive talent is a scarce resource, (ii) productivity is increasing in 
experience and innate ability, and (iii) the marginal impact of workers’ talent is increasing in the 
value of assets under their control, implying that only the most talented employees will be 
assigned to large, complicated, portfolios of tasks. 
Traditional treatments of the principal-agent problem predict that “action-based” (that is, 
high signal-to-noise ratio) performance measures will be used extensively, as they allow stronger 
incentives without requiring a high risk premium for the employee (e.g., Banker and Datar 
[1989]). As noted by Baker [2002], however, action-based measures are “narrow” or 
“incomplete,” potentially providing distorted incentives (i.e., if overemphasized, they incentivize 
the wrong behavior). “Outcome-based” performance measures, on the other hand, typically 
provide greater goal-congruence but require a higher risk premium for the employee.  Moreover, 
in complex production environments in which each action’s marginal product is state-contingent, 
tying their rewards to outcome-based measures provides employees with stronger incentives to 
utilize non-contractible (i.e., tacit), state-specific knowledge (Prendergast [2002], Baker and 
Jorgensen [2003], and Raith [2008]).  
                                                 
6 See Milgrom and Roberts [1992], Gibbons and Waldman [1999], and Prendergast [1999] for reviews of these literatures.      
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We use these insights to frame our investigation of the determinants of sell-side analyst 
compensation. Our choice of compensation determinants also is guided by the sample bank’s 
2005 analyst evaluation and development booklet as well as field interviews at eleven investment 
banks and prior analyst research.   
In assembling our variables, which are defined in the Appendix, we ensured that the 
measurement intervals were consistent with the timing of compensation awards. Each variable’s 
outcome is realized prior to the compensation award date, and therefore is a potential input to the 
compensation decision.   
 
4.1. OUTCOME-BASED PERFORMANCE VARIABLES 
Institutional  Investor  Ratings.  Since  1972,  Institutional  Investor  (II)  has  conducted 
annual surveys of buy-side institutions’ ratings of sell-side analysts who “have been the most 
helpful to them and their institution in researching U.S. equities over the past twelve months” 
(Institutional Investor [1996, 1997]). Based on these surveys, a list of the top-three analysts and 
runners-up  by  industry  is  published  in  the  magazine’s  October  issue.  “All-Star”  ratings  are 
widely  viewed  as  the  most  comprehensive  public  measure  of  analyst  performance  (e.g., 
Bradshaw [2008]). We construct an II All-Star indicator variable that takes the value one if an 
analyst at the sample firm is named by II as one of the top-three analysts or a runner-up in a 
given year, and zero otherwise. 
Prior  research  suggests  that  All-Star  analysts  contribute  to  the  performance  of  their 
investment  banks  by  generating  higher  trading  volumes  (Jackson  [2005])  and  attracting 
investment-banking clients (Dunbar [2000], Krigman et al. [2001], and Clarke, Khorana, Patel, 
and Rau [2007]). Among higher-status banks, II-ratings are likely to be highly correlated with 
client votes on the quality of analysts’ research that are used to allocate transactions and, hence,      
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commissions  among  banks.  Data  from  the  research  director’s  2005  performance-evaluation 
booklet indicates that among the ten analysts with the highest client votes, eight were II-rated 
(none of the ten analysts with the lowest client votes were II-rated).
7   
Firm management and practitioners stated that banks prefer to tie analyst compensation, 
when available, to client votes (as opposed to the trading volumes  and commissions of covered 
stocks). According to these insiders, client votes incorporate the impact of important externalities 
and better reflect an analyst’s contribution to total (i.e., bank-wide) commission revenue. First, 
votes are not as affected by the quality of a bank’s traders. Further, an analyst’s research on a 
stock can lead clients to continue holding the security and, hence, not affect trading. Yet clients 
that  value  such  research  typically  reward  the  bank  for  the  research  by  allocating  it  trading 
commissions on other stock transactions. Consistent with these arguments, O’Brien and Bhushan 
[1990, p. 59] observe that “it is rare (and controversial) for research analysts’ compensation to be 
explicitly based on commissions.” 
Investment-Banking  Contribution.  Our second outcome-based performance measure is 
the analyst’s contribution to the bank’s investment-banking operations. Analysts contribute to 
investment-banking  deals  by  identifying  potential  issuers,  providing  investors  with  valuable 
information about issuers, and participating in road shows to sell issues to institutional clients. 
For  each  analyst-year,  our  primary  banking  variable  is  the  annual  equity  underwriting  fees 
earned by the bank from the companies an analyst covered. Since the fees received by each bank 
are  not  publicly  disclosed,  we  estimate  the  banking  fees  received  from  each  deal  using  the 
following algorithm: the management fee, which typically accounts for 20% of the gross spread, 
                                                 
7 Fisher’s exact test indicates this association to be statistically significant at the 1% level.       
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is divided equally among the book-runners, and the underwriting fee and selling concessions are 
divided equally among all syndicate members.
8  
Stock  Recommendation  Performance.  Prior  research  suggests  that  (changes  in)  stock 
recommendations  have  investment  value  for  bank  clients  (Womack  [1996],  Irvine  [2004], 
Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee [2004], Green [2006], Juergens and Lindsey [2009]). Analysts 
with  superior  recommendation  performance  potentially  create  value  by  enhancing  a  bank’s 
reputation  in  the  WSJ’s  research  ratings,  which  are  based  solely  on  recommendation 
performance, and by generating commission revenues from clients who value their research. 
Many  of  the  research  directors  we  interviewed  indicated  that  they  track  analysts’ 
recommendation performance, and anecdotal evidence suggests that investment banks care about 
the WSJ’s ratings. For example, Merrill Lynch posted on its Web site the names of its nine 
analysts  who  made  the  2005  WSJ  rankings,  and  the  head  of  its  Americas  Equity  Research 
commented on the bank’s strong ranking (Merrill Lynch [2005]). 
Our primary measure of stock-picking ability is an indicator variable that takes the value 
one if the WSJ’s annual ratings identified the analyst as one of the top-five stock pickers in his or 
her industry, and zero otherwise.
9 In Section 6.2 we also examine the mean annualized raw 
return to buy and strong-buy recommendations, the approach used by the sample firm to measure 
recommendation performance. This measure is constructed by scaling the return to each buy and 
                                                 
8 This simple algorithm assumes an equal allocation across syndicate members. Although we are unaware of any research on 
SEO allocations, research on IPO allocations using proprietary data indicates that book-runners typically receive a larger share 
allocation (see Iannotta [2010] for a review of this literature). Consequently, we also estimated equity underwriting fees by 
dividing total fees by the number of book-runners. This approach implicitly assumes that a deal’s book-runners were allocated 
100% of the shares in the equity underwriting process. Our results are robust to this alternate fee estimation algorithm (see 
Section 6.4).  
9 To be eligible, an analyst must cover five or more qualified stocks in the industry (i.e., stocks that trade above $2/share and 
have a market cap of more than $50 million), and at least two of the qualified stocks must be among the ten largest stocks in the 
industry (the theory is that no one can truly understand an industry without a thorough knowledge of at least some of its biggest 
firms). As noted by Emery and Li [2009], these eligibility conditions are generally non-binding for analysts at larger brokerage 
houses, such as the bank studied here, and, conditional on eligibility, the ratings are entirely determined by stock-picking 
performance.      
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strong-buy recommendation by the number of days a stock is held relative to the number of days 
in the year. For example, if a buy recommendation generates a return of 7% for 60 days, the 
annualized return is 43% (7%*365/60).  
Earnings  Forecast  Accuracy.  Research  on  analysts’  earnings  forecasts  finds  more 
accurate forecasting to be associated with “favorable” job transitions (Mikhail et al. [1999] and 
Hong and Kubik [2003]) and top-tier investment banks to employ significantly more accurate 
forecasters (e.g., Clement [1999], Malloy [2005], and Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy [2006]). It 
thus appears that prestigious Wall Street research houses like our sample firm demand forecast 
accuracy.  
As  discussed in  Section 6.1, forecast  accuracy  was  not  formally tracked in  the 2005 
performance evaluation and development booklet received from the sample bank. Consequently, 
we rely on prior literature to guide our choice of a forecast accuracy index. We use analysts’ 
most  recent  annual  earnings  forecasts  issued  from  360  to  90  days  prior  to  annual  earnings 
announcements that fall within the compensation evaluation period.
10,11 Following Gu and Wu 
[2003] and Basu and Markov [2004], we compute absolute (as opposed to squared) forecast 
errors for each analyst-firm-year. These unsigned errors are aggregated into a single relative 
performance score using the following formula:
1
100 100
ijt
jt
Rank
I

 , where Ijt is the number of 
analysts following firm j in year t and Rankijt is analyst i’s accuracy rank relative to all other 
analysts covering firm j in year t (see Hong and Kubik [2003] and Ke and Yu [2006]). Lastly, we 
                                                 
10 Prior studies of analyst incentives use annual (as opposed to quarterly) earnings forecasts (e.g., Hong and Kubik [2003], Ke 
and Yu [2006], Leone and Wu [2007], Ertimur, Mayew, and Stubben [2008], and Call, Chen, and Tong [2009]) and the most 
recent forecast issued  (e.g. O’Brien [1990], Clement [1999], Jacob, Lys, and Neale [1999], Mikhail et al. [1999], Hong and 
Kubik [2003], and Ke and Yu [2006]).  
11 Our results are robust to alternate windows including 10-90 days before the announcement, 90-180 days before the 
announcement, 180-270 days before the announcement, and 270-360 days before the announcement. We obtain similar results 
when we control for length of the forecasting horizon.      
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average the relative scores  over all companies  covered by an analyst  within a performance-
evaluation year.
12  
 
4.2. ACTION-BASED PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Earnings  Forecast  Update  Frequency.  This  measure  was  included  in  the  2005 
performance evaluation and development booklet received from our sample bank and widely 
tracked by other banks we interviewed. It also is the most widely used action-based performance 
measure in the analyst literature. Jacob et al. [1999], Mikhail, Walther and Willis [2009], and 
Pandit, Willis, and Zhou [2009] use it as a proxy for analyst effort, which theory predicts should 
be strongly associated with incentive compensation (e.g., Holmström [1979]). Moreover, prior 
research  suggests  that  this  variable  is  a  leading  indicator  of  investment-banking  revenues. 
Krigman et al. [2001], for example, find dissatisfaction with frequency of coverage to be a key 
determinant of firms’ decisions to switch underwriters. Finally, frequent revisions may generate 
abnormal commission revenue (e.g., Juergens and Lindsey [2009]). 
We compute earnings estimate update frequency as the number of annual forecasts issued 
by  an  analyst  each  year  during  the  360  to  90  days  prior  to  a  covered  company’s  EPS 
announcement (broadly similar to the approach used in Hong et al. [2000]).  
Coverage Initiations. Our second action-based performance measure is the number of 
coverage  initiations  made  by  an  analyst.  Initiations  were  widely  tracked  by  the  banks  we 
interviewed,  appeared  in  the  sample  firm’s  2005  performance  evaluation  and  development 
booklet, and have been the subject of prior academic research. Ertimur, Muslu, and Zhang [2007] 
and  Bradshaw,  Richardson,  and  Sloan  [2006],  for  example,  cite  anecdotes  that  suggest  that 
analysts may be compensated on the basis of initiation frequency.  
                                                 
12 Following Jacob et. al. [1999], Ke and Yu [2006], and others, we drop companies for which Ijt < 3 because relative 
performance isn’t meaningful in such situations.      
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4.3. JOB CHARACTERISTICS 
Portfolio  Scale.  Research  directors  we  interviewed  indicated  that  it  is  particularly 
important to have strong analysts cover large, highly traded stocks that have a disproportionate 
impact on the business. Their claim is supported by large-sample evidence in Hong and Kubik 
[2003] and a recent Sanford C. Bernstein report (Hintz, Werner, and St. John [2006]) that argues 
that analysts who cover large portfolios are more visible, generate greater commissions, and are 
allocated a large share of the firm’s research resources. Because banks bid aggressively for the 
services  of  analysts  with  the  requisite  skill  to  cover  these  portfolios,  we  expect  a  positive 
association between portfolio scale and compensation. 
Consistent with the sample bank, we measure portfolio scale as the aggregate market 
capitalization of covered stocks.
13 To ensure that we capture scale and not the performance of 
covered stocks, we measure the market capitalization of each stock covered during year  t at the 
beginning of the performance-evaluation period (i.e., December 1
st, t-1). Finally, to facilitate 
interpretation of the pay-scale relation, we take the natural logarithm of our portfolio scale proxy. 
Consequently, our regression parameters can be interpreted as the partial elasticity of pay with 
respect to portfolio size (e.g., Rosen [1992]).  
 
4.4. HUMAN CAPITAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Experience. If analysts learn important tasks like mentoring through experience, and these 
benefits are not fully captured in our outcome- and action-based measures of performance, we 
should find a positive association between analyst compensation and experience. Equivalently, 
experience can be viewed as a control for unobservable performance variables. In our tests, 
                                                 
13 We obtain a similar, albeit weaker, association when we substitute number of stocks covered for market capitalization. When 
we  include  both  market  capitalization  and  number  of  stocks  covered,  only  the  market  capitalization  of  covered  stocks  is 
economically or statistically significant in our model.      
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analyst experience is defined as the number of years an analyst has been employed as a senior 
analyst.
14  
To preserve the sample firm’s anonymity, we do not report descriptive statistics for its 
analysts  on  the  explanatory  variables  described  above.  However,  unreported  tests  show  the 
sample analysts to be indistinguishable from their peers at other top-20 rated firms in terms of II 
rating,  experience,  forecast  accuracy,  strong-buy/buy  recommendation  performance,  portfolio 
scale, number of firms covered, and annual number of forecast revisions and stock initiations 
issued. 
 
5.  Main Results  
Following other compensation studies and guided by Rosen [1992], we use logarithmic 
regressions to estimate the implicit weights the sample firm’s compensation system places on 
various measures. Compensation response coefficients are estimated using total direct 
compensation for the period 1994 to 2005. We estimate three models, (i) a pooled model, (ii) a 
“within-analyst” fixed-effects model, and (iii) a “between-analyst” cross-sectional model. 
Significance levels for the first two models are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered by analyst and year (Petersen [2009]).  Because the between-analyst cross-sectional 
model includes only one observation per analyst, we report significance levels based on White’s 
[1980] heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. To control for the effects of general market 
movements documented in Figure 3, we include in our regression models lagged values of the 
Baker and Wurgler [2006] index. Our results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar when we 
substitute for this index a set of year indicator variables. 
                                                 
14 Experience, as noted by Clement, Koonce, and Lopez [2007], is a broad concept, and different types of experience can be 
associated with different types of human capital. Our definition of experience is similar to Clement’s [1999] in that it captures 
analysts’ experience within the profession (as opposed to experience covering specific stocks, events, or transactions).      
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5.1. POOLED MODEL 
The first column of Table 1 presents results for our pooled total compensation model. 
The estimated coefficients indicate that four variables (in addition to the market activity index) 
have economically and statistically significant associations with analyst pay: All-Star status; 
portfolio scale; investment-banking contributions; and recognition by the WSJ as a star stock-
picker. The coefficients for forecast accuracy, number of forecast revisions, number of stock 
initiations, and analyst experience are statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
The estimated All-Star coefficient of 0.476 implies that, on average, total compensation 
of All-Star analysts was 61% higher than that of non-star analysts, holding other factors 
constant.
15 The parameter estimate on our portfolio scale variable, the natural logarithm of the 
lagged market capitalization of covered stocks, is 0.178, implying that an analyst whose portfolio 
is at the third market capitalization quartile earned approximately 41% higher total compensation 
than a peer who covered a portfolio at the first market capitalization quartile, holding other 
factors constant. The investment-banking coefficient of 0.070 indicates that, on average, an 
analyst who generates $1 million in banking-related revenue will earn 7% more compensation 
than a peer with no banking contributions, holding other factors constant. Finally, the 0.209 WSJ 
coefficient indicates that analysts whose stock-picking performance is formally recognized by 
the WSJ earn approximately 23% more than their unranked peers, holding other factors constant. 
 
5.2. FIXED-EFFECTS MODEL 
As  noted  by  Murphy  [1985],  in  a  pooled  compensation  regression  the  explanatory 
variables may be correlated with unobservable factors (such as talent/ability) that are the real 
                                                 
15 A one-unit change in the explanatory variable X is associated with a 100 ∙ (e
b – 1)% change in compensation, where b 
denotes the estimated coefficient on variable X.      
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drivers of compensation. A common approach to dealing with this concern is to use a fixed-
effects  model.  Wooldridge  [2002],  among  others,  has  shown  a  fixed-effect  specification  to 
provide consistent parameter estimates if choices (i.e., assignment or selection) are a function of 
the  unobservable  fixed-effects.  Including  analyst  fixed-effects  in  our  compensation  model 
controls  for  time-invariant  cross-sectional  differences  in  analyst  ability,  which  enables  us  to 
examine  whether  “within-analyst”  variation  in  our  explanatory  variables  (e.g.,  II  ranking, 
investment-banking contributions) is related to “within-analyst” variation in compensation.
16 
The results of the fixed-effects model are reported in the second column of Table 1. 
Because fixed-effects require at least two observations for each analyst, sample size declines 
from 401 to 374 analyst-year observations. Similar to our pooled results, we find four variables 
to be highly associated with compensation: All-Star status; portfolio scale; investment-banking 
transactions by covered firms; and star stock picking. The All-Star coefficient of 0.145 implies 
that gaining (losing) II status is accompanied by a 16% compensation premium (penalty). In 
unreported  tests,  we  are  unable  to  reject  the  hypothesis  that  the  percentage  increase  in 
compensation from gaining All-Star status equals the percentage decrease in compensation from 
losing All-Star status. This fixed-effect estimate is considerably smaller than that obtained from 
our pooled model (61%). There are two potential explanations for this difference. First, if All-
Star status and analyst ability are correlated, some of the All-Star effect from the pooled model 
will  be  subsumed  in  the  analyst  fixed-effect.  A  second  explanation  is  that  a  compensation 
premium  accrues  to  star  analysts  who  are  ranked  highly  year  after  year.  This  premium  is 
                                                 
16  As  an  alternative  to  fixed-effects,  some  compensation  studies  employ  first-differences  (i.e.,  “changes”).  As  noted  by 
Wooldridge [2002] and Cameron and Trivedi [2005], when the number of time periods equals 2, both estimators are equivalent. 
When T > 2 and the model is well specified, both estimators are unbiased and consistent. Consequently, differences between the 
estimators will reflect differences in efficiency. Which estimator is more efficient depends on the structure of the time-variant 
disturbance term. If the time-variant disturbance term approximates a random walk, first-differences are more efficient; if it is 
serially uncorrelated, fixed-effects are more efficient. In most cases, the truth lies somewhere in between. Thus, as a robustness 
test, we repeated each of our analyses using first-differences. Our inferences were unchanged.      
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reflected in pooled estimates, but not in the fixed-effect model because it is unusual for analysts 
who have been ranked for a number of years to lose their ranking. 
The portfolio scale elasticity estimate of 0.069 implies that the compensation of analysts 
who increase the scale of their portfolio by 10% will increase, on average, by less than 1%. 
Although  statistically  significant,  this  estimated  coefficient  is  considerably  smaller  than  the 
corresponding figure from the pooled regression, indicating that the pooled compensation-scale 
relation partially reflects the matching of more talented analysts to larger portfolios of stocks 
(i.e., pay for ability). This result is consistent with the job characteristics literature prediction that 
highly talented analysts will be sought to cover economically important industries/portfolios of 
stocks and their high pay will reflect a scarcity rent. According to the theory, compensation and 
portfolio scale are jointly determined by (unobservable) abilities.   
Our fixed-effect estimates indicate that gaining or losing star stock-picker status in the 
WSJ is associated with an 11% change in pay. We are unable to reject the hypothesis that the 
percentage  increase  in  compensation  from  gaining  WSJ  recognition  equals  the  percentage 
decrease in compensation from losing WSJ recognition. Note that whereas the II coefficient from 
the fixed-effects model is only 30% as large as the corresponding pooled coefficient, the WSJ 
coefficient from the fixed-effects model is 50% as large as the corresponding pooled estimate. 
This finding is consistent with evidence reported by Emery and Li [2009] that WSJ stock-picking 
ratings are considerably less persistent than II ratings (the year-to-year probability of retaining II 
status is approximately 0.7, the year-to-year probability of retaining WSJ status around 0.2). 
The fixed-effect estimate for investment banking is 0.058, similar to the pooled estimate. 
Estimates for the remaining variables – forecast accuracy, forecast revisions, stock initiations, 
and experience – are insignificantly different from zero.  
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5.3 “BETWEEN-ANALYST” CROSS-SECTIONAL MODEL 
Our third model uses the average values of compensation and independent variables 
during each analyst’s employment with the sample firm. By including each analyst in the sample 
only once, this approach controls for any dependence among analyst observations (Greene 
[2000]).
17 More important, it mitigates any timing mismatches (i.e., lead/lag issues) in our 
independent variables, and indicates whether consistently strong performance is rewarded with 
greater pay over an analyst’s tenure. Finally, it provides a bridge between the pooled model and 
“within-analyst” fixed-effect model, as it represents the variation in the pooled model that has 
been purged from the fixed-effect model (Murphy [1985], Greene [2000], Verbeek [2005]).  
The findings reported in the third column of Table 1 indicate that analyst compensation is 
related to the same four analyst characteristics. Not surprisingly, the estimates are typically much 
larger than those reported for the “within-analyst” fixed-effect model. For example, the II All-
Star estimate of 0.736 implies that, on average, analysts rated as All-Stars consistently 
throughout their employment at the sample firm earned 109% higher compensation than analysts 
who were never rated. 
  
6.  Additional Analyses  
6.1. FORECAST ACCURACY 
Finding no economically or statistically significant association between forecast accuracy 
and compensation is somewhat surprising given prior evidence that forecast accuracy is related 
to analysts’ career prospects (see Mikhail et al. [1999] and Hong and Kubik [2003]). But it is 
consistent with the inferences from our interviews at eleven leading banks, and the fact that the 
research director’s 2005 analyst evaluation and development booklet did not track analysts’ 
                                                 
17 Given that we report significance levels based on 2-way clustered standard errors, our pooled and fixed-effect models should 
not be affected by dependence among analyst observations (Petersen [2009]).       
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forecasting performance. When asked about this omission, the bank’s research director 
remarked: “I have never tracked it and nowhere that I have been did before I arrived. I don't 
think it is any kind of acid test for whether an analyst has keen insight. If the clients pay attention 
to and pay for the services of an analyst, then that is a ‘good’ analyst, whether or not they get the 
earnings, or for that matter, stock prices, right.”  
  The fact that forecast accuracy was excluded from the bank’s analyst evaluation and 
development documents presents strong evidence that forecast accuracy is not a direct 
determinant of analyst compensation. It is possible, though, that forecast accuracy is implicitly 
rewarded through other mechanisms, such as II ratings.  Consequently, in this section we provide 
additional analyses of analysts’ forecasting incentives, and examine whether the lack of 
association documented in Table 1 is an artifact of our research design. 
6.1.1. Noisy Forecast Accuracy Measure, Correlated Regressors, and Small Sample Size. To 
investigate whether our findings are sensitive to the forecast accuracy metric employed, we 
construct four other forecast accuracy metrics that are popular in the analyst literature, (i) 
undeflated absolute forecast errors, (ii) price-deflated absolute forecast errors, (iii) the 
proportional mean absolute forecast error (PMAFE) metric reported in Clement [1999], Jacob et 
al. [1999], and Clement et al. [2007], and (iv) the standard-deviation-deflated measure (PSAFE) 
reported in Groysberg, Healy, and Chapman [2008].
18 Each of these metrics is estimated using 
both annual and quarterly forecast data from I/B/E/S. Definitions are reported in Panel B of the 
Appendix. In addition to these I/B/E/S-based metrics, we use an indicator variable that takes the 
value one if the WSJ’s annual ratings identified the analyst as one of the top-five forecasters in 
                                                 
18 In unreported analyses, we examine forecast metrics for the most recent two and three years (as opposed to the most recent 
year); year-to-year changes in forecast accuracy, as opposed to the level of forecast accuracy; the first (as opposed to last) 
forecast within the forecast window; squared, as opposed to absolute, forecast errors; and analysts’ median, as opposed to mean, 
forecast accuracy.      
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his or her industry, and zero otherwise. 
To ensure that the relation between compensation and forecast accuracy is not subsumed by 
other regressors, we exclude all other variables from the model except the lagged Baker and 
Wurgler index that controls for exogenous variation in the bank’s bonus pool. For tests involving 
the I/B/E/S-based forecast accuracy metrics, dropping these variables also enables us to utilize 
the larger 1988-2005 sample, thereby increasing the power of our tests.  
Pay-for-accuracy coefficients are estimated for each forecast accuracy measure as well as for 
the average relative forecast accuracy score used above. To compare the parameter estimates for 
these variables given their scale differences (e.g., average undeflated forecast errors are reported 
in cents and the forecast accuracy index is a 0-100 relative scale), we standardize the 
compensation and explanatory variables to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. The 
estimated coefficients then indicate how a one standard deviation change in forecast accuracy 
affects compensation (in standard deviations).  
Panel A of Table 2 reports standardized coefficients for the I/B/E/S-based accuracy metrics. 
The results indicate that the weak pay-for-accuracy relation documented in Table 1 is not an 
artifact of the forecast metric used, the inclusion of other (potentially correlated) variables, or the 
smaller 1994-2005 sample. Even with 18 years of data from one of the largest sell-side research 
departments on Wall Street, none of the forecast accuracy estimates is statistically or 
economically significant.  
The standardized WSJ forecast accuracy estimated coefficient is reported in Panel B of Table 
2. Because it is a binary variable and available only for eight of the eighteen years examined in 
Panel A, the magnitude and significance of the WSJ parameter estimate cannot be directly 
compared to those of the I/B/E/S-based measures reported in Panel A. However, the results are      
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consistent with those reported earlier; appearing in the WSJ’s star forecaster table does not have 
a meaningful impact on analyst compensation.  
6.1.2. Limited Variation in Forecast Accuracy for Sample Firm Analysts. To test whether the 
sample firm selects and retains analysts with similar forecasting performance, reducing the 
power of our tests, we compare the variation in analyst forecast accuracy within the sample bank 
to the variation within I/B/E/S as a whole. Consistent with Ke and Yu [2006, Table 1 Panel C], 
the interquartile range of the relative forecast accuracy score within the I/B/E/S population is 
approximately 17. We find a similar interquartile range (approximately 16) among analysts 
employed by our sample bank, indicating that our insignificant forecasting results are not due to 
lack of variation in our forecast accuracy measure.  
6.1.3. Forecasting and Analyst Turnover. Although we are unable to detect an association 
between annual compensation and forecast accuracy, it is important to note that annual 
compensation captures only a portion of analysts’ incentives. If subsequent employers base 
posterior assessments of analysts’ abilities on past- and present-period performance realizations, 
then even in the absence of a formal bonus-based contract an analyst may face strong forecasting 
incentives (e.g., Holmström [1999]). Analysts at high-status banks faced with an outside offer 
from a rival typically receive matching offers from their current employers (e.g., Gasparino 
[2005]). As a result, Ke and Yu [2006, p. 970] argue that analysts’ career incentives are more 
influenced by threat of dismissal than by the prospect of receiving an offer from a higher-ranked 
firm. To assess the performance-dismissal relation at our sample firm, we examine the 
characteristics of “fired” analysts (i.e., analysts who move from our high-status bank to a lower-
status I/B/E/S employer, or exit I/B/E/S completely). The results (untabulated) indicate that 
“fired” analysts had larger absolute forecast errors than other analysts who covered the same      
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stocks and larger relative forecast errors than other analysts within the sample firm. These 
findings suggest that forecasting is related to turnover, but not to compensation. It also increases 
our confidence that our compensation-forecast findings are not attributable to an outlier sample 
firm (see Section 6.5 for further discussion of generalizability and external validity).  
 
6.2. STOCK-PICKING 
Our primary tests, reported in Table 1, indicate that top stock pickers, as rated by the 
WSJ, are paid significantly more than their non-rated peers and that intra-analyst variation in 
WSJ status has a meaningful effect on analyst compensation. Since the WSJ’s ratings are based 
solely on stock-picking performance, our tests indicate that stock-picking performance has 
implications for analyst compensation. This finding is noteworthy given that both Mikhail et al. 
[1999] and Hong and Kubik [2003] do not find a significant association between stock-picking 
performance and analyst turnover.   
  In this section, we provide a more detailed investigation of analysts’ stock-picking 
incentives.  In addition to the WSJ variable from our primary tests, we examine the metric used 
by the sample bank for internal purposes (i.e., analyst evaluation and development). As discussed 
in Section 4.1, this measure is constructed by scaling the recommended holding period return of 
each buy and strong-buy recommendation by the number of recommended holding days relative 
to the number of days in the year. For robustness, we also examine market- and four-factor-
adjusted analyst-year alphas estimated using the calendar-time, long-window abnormal-return 
methodology in Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman [2007] (hereafter, BLT). These variables are 
discussed in greater detail in Panel C of the Appendix.        
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  Since the WSJ ratings are released with a lag, there is a separation between the period in 
which performance occurs and the period in which the award is announced.
19 This implies that 
the effect of contemporaneous WSJ award status should be compared to the effect of lagged 
stock-picking performance, as captured by the bank’s measure and the two BLT measures. 
Consistent with this argument, and the results in Emery and Li [2009], we find that analysts who 
received WSJ awards had strong stock-picking performance one year prior to, but not in, the 
award year.
 20 
Table 3 reports pay-for-performance sensitivities (i.e., fixed-effect regression parameters) 
for contemporaneous WSJ award status and one-year lagged stock-picking performance using the 
sample bank’s average annualized return metric and the two BLT measures. Because stock-
picking performance may be associated with other variables, such as II status, we exclude from 
the model all other variables except the lagged market activity index.   
Several points are worth noting.  First, when all other variables are dropped from the 
model, the WSJ coefficient rises from 0.107 (in Table 1) to 0.148, implying that gaining or losing 
WSJ status is associated with a 16% change in compensation. Second, among the three alternate 
stock picking measures, the bank’s metric is most strongly associated with analyst compensation. 
But although statistically significant (p-value < 0.001), this effect is not economically large, 
especially when compared to the effect of WSJ recognition. The estimate of 0.066 implies that 
the average WSJ-rated analyst who generated a lagged buy recommendation return of 30% 
                                                 
19 As noted earlier, the bank’s performance evaluation period runs from December 1 to November 30. During the 1994-1999 
(2000-2005)  period,  when  the  WSJ’s  report  was  prepared  by  Zack’s  (Thomson/First  Call),  stock-picking  performance  was 
measured over the period December 1-November 30 (January 1-December 31), but the results did not appear in print until June 
or July of the following year.   
20 For our sample firm, award-winning analysts’ recommendations outperformed their peers’ recommendations by 30% (11%) 
over the December 1-November 30 period preceding the award’s announcement based on the bank’s annualized return metric 
and the market- (four-factor-) adjusted annualized alpha. Over the December 1-November 30 period surrounding the award’s 
June/July announcement, the performance differential dropped to 4% (0%) based on the bank’s metric (the two BLT metrics).      
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earned only 2% (0.066   0.30) additional compensation from this performance, versus 16% 
higher pay for appearing in the WSJ report. Third, there is no association between analyst 
compensation and the four-factor-adjusted BLT alpha, our most sophisticated measure of stock-
picking performance. Finally, unreported tests show that compensation is unrelated to 
contemporaneous stock picking performance using any of the three return metrics. 
 
6.3. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR RATINGS 
In 1995, Institutional Investor began selling investment banks comprehensive 
information on the number of votes received by all analysts who received one or more buy-side 
votes within a given industry. This information, which we obtained for the years 1996-2002, 
partitions analysts who did not appear in the October issue of Institutional Investor (i.e., analysts 
who did not receive at least a runner-up rank) into (i) analysts who received at least five, but not 
enough, votes to appear in the magazine, (ii) analysts who received between one and four votes 
(termed “honorable mentions”), and (iii) analysts who received no votes.  
The fixed-effect estimates (untabulated) are 0.487 for All-Star analysts named in II and 
0.377 for analysts who received at least five votes but were not rated All-Stars, both highly 
significant. The estimate for analysts with between one and four votes (0.031) is economically 
and statistically insignificant. These estimates imply that moving from no votes to All-Star status 
was associated with a 63% increase in pay, and moving from no votes to at least 5 votes (but not 
enough votes to become an All-Star) was associated with a 46% increase in pay, but moving 
from no votes to four or fewer votes did not lead to a significant increase in pay. It thus appears 
that the compensation allocation process is designed to reward not only top-rated analysts, but      
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also analysts with moderate ratings.
21 It is also consistent with II-ratings proxying for the 
institutional client votes that are used to allocate commissions across banks and analysts.
22 
Merely appearing in II’s magazine (i.e., having “Stardom”) is not all that matters; the number of 
votes also counts. In fact, when we re-estimate the fixed-effects model reported in Table 1 with 
an additional variable, the number of votes received by each analyst in the II poll, the II All-Star 
indicator variable becomes economically and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Thus, 
controlling for the number of votes, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that compensation is 
unrelated to whether an analyst appears as an “All-Star” in II’s magazine. 
 
6.4. INVESTMENT BANKING CONTRIBUTIONS 
The analyst investment-banking variable used in our tests is the estimated equity 
underwriting fees earned by the bank from the companies covered by an analyst. This 
incorporates both book-runner- and syndicate-based deals and was chosen based on discussions 
with research staff at several major banks. 
To evaluate whether our findings are sensitive to this proxy, we examined a number of 
other specifications including (i) the number of firms covered by an analyst in a given year that 
hired the bank to be a book-runner on an equity transaction, (ii) equity book-runner fees to the 
bank in a given year from firms covered by an analyst, (iii) the number of firms covered by an 
analyst in a given year that hired the bank to be a book-runner or a syndicate participant on an 
equity transaction, (iv) estimated fees to the bank in a given year for book-runner/syndicate 
participation in equity and debt transactions and for M&A advising for firms covered by an 
                                                 
21 Similarly, among analysts that appear in II’s October issue, we find a significant step in compensation between first- and 
second-ranked analysts and between second- and third-ranked analysts, but not between third-ranked and runner up analysts. 
22 As discussed in Section 4.1, interviews and the research director’s 2005 performance-evaluation booklet indicate that client 
votes and II votes exhibit significantly positive associations.      
 
27 
 
analyst, and (v) equity book-runner and syndicate fees to the bank in a given year from new and 
past client firms covered by an analyst.  
The results (unreported) provide strong, consistent support for our earlier inferences. 
First, there is a strong positive association between compensation and equity underwriting fees. 
Larger deals, however measured, are clearly associated with higher pay. When we re-estimate 
Model 2 from Table 1 using the alternate banking measures, our fixed-effects estimates indicate 
that an average equity underwriting transaction is associated with a 7.5% pay premium. The 
rewards for book-runner transactions are larger, approximately 9%-10% per transaction, 
reflecting their larger fees. The reward per dollar of fees, however, is the same across book-
runner- and non-book-runner-based deals; each million in fees is associated with a 6%-7% pay 
premium. Second, the compensation effects of equity transaction fees are similar for new and 
existing clients (0.057 and 0.061, respectively).  Thus, little is lost by combining these 
transactions, as was done in our primary tests and in the remainder of the paper. Third, we are 
unable to reject the null hypothesis that sell-side equity analyst compensation is unrelated to debt 
underwriting and M&A fees from covered stocks, further validating our emphasis on equity 
underwriting transactions. Finally, changing our investment banking proxy does not have a 
material impact on our model’s other parameters, further supporting the validity of our primary 
model. 
 
 
6.5. GENERALIZABILITY 
Due to data limitations, our sample is composed entirely of analysts from one firm. This 
restriction reduces the likelihood that our results are due to a spurious correlation caused by 
unobserved heterogeneity, a claim supported by the battery of robustness tests reported above. 
But it also raises a question about whether our findings can be generalized to other top-tier firms.      
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Expressed somewhat differently, although we have taken steps to ensure and document the 
internal validity of our study, we have not provided any evidence of its external validity. 
Nevertheless, our interviews with research directors indicated remarkable consistency in 
the performance metrics used to determine analyst bonus awards. According to the research 
directors we interviewed, two mechanisms ensure that compensation practices remain similar 
across top-tier banks. The first is considerable inter-firm job-hopping by analysts and research 
directors, which should facilitate the transfer of performance evaluation and remuneration 
practices across firms (Frederickson, Peffer, and Pratt [1999]). Second, compensation 
benchmarking is widespread on Wall Street.
23 Moreover, consistent with claims that analysts 
encounter similar remuneration practices and incentives across top-tier employers, prior research 
finds no evidence of changes in behavior when analysts move from one full-service investment 
bank to another (Clarke et al. [2007]).
  
To provide additional evidence of the robustness and generalizability of our findings, we 
re-estimate our regression equations using data from a different top-20 investment bank from 
which we obtained annual total compensation data for 240 analyst-year observations over the 
years 1988 to 1993. During this period, mean (median) real compensation (in 2005 dollars) for 
analysts at this second firm was $530,862 ($505,848), quite similar to the mean (median) real 
compensation for analysts at our primary firm, which was $545,177 ($525,386) over the same 
period. 
Compensation  regressions  for  the  primary  and  secondary  firms  (firms  1  and  2, 
respectively) as well as statistical tests of differences are reported in Table 4 (for brevity, we 
                                                 
23 One firm, McLagan Partners, provided most of the benchmarking data and consulting services for financial services and 
securities firms for much of our sample period.      
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report only the fixed-effects results). The similarity of results across the two banks increases our 
confidence that the sample firm findings are not purely idiosyncratic.  
 
7.   Conclusion 
  Prior research has shown analysts at leading investment banks to have the ability to drive 
security prices (e.g., Stickel [1995] and Womack [1996]), trading volume (e.g., Irvine [2000, 
2004] and Juergens and Lindsey [2009]), and corporate financing activity (e.g., Krigman et al. 
[2001]). Although much has been written about the explicit incentives of these important 
information intermediaries, because prior hypotheses have not been subjected to direct empirical 
testing, financial economists have been unable to make ceteris paribus statements regarding the 
determinants of analysts’ compensation. This study, which uses nearly two decades of 
compensation data from a large investment bank, is a first step towards closing this gap in the 
literature. 
Prior studies have argued that analysts face strong, bonus-based forecasting incentives. 
This assumption is often motivated by associations between forecast accuracy and Institutional 
Investor “All-Star” status, which are linked anecdotally to analyst compensation (e.g., Stickel 
[1992]). Our paper challenges this view. Although All-Star status is strongly associated with 
analyst pay, the variation in All-Star status that drives analyst pay is orthogonal to forecast 
accuracy measured using a wide variety of forecast periods and estimation methods. 
  The compensation consequences of All-Star status cannot be attributed solely to All-Star 
analysts having greater investment banking deal flow. Controlling for investment banking 
contributions and a host of other variables, we find that II-ranked analysts earn 61% more than 
non-II-ranked analysts. Fixed-effects regressions that control for unobserved analyst 
heterogeneity show that gaining (losing) II status confers an immediate compensation premium      
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(penalty) equal to approximately 16% of annual compensation. Additional tests show analyst 
compensation to be related to II votes even for analysts not mentioned in II magazine. II votes 
are strongly related to buy-side client votes, which are used to allocate commissions across 
banks. Together these relationships suggest that the II compensation effect likely represents 
rewards for generating institutional trading commission revenues.    
Not surprisingly, investment-banking contributions are an important determinant of 
analyst remuneration. But only equity underwriting activities are associated with analyst pay. For 
our sample firm, we find no evidence that sell-side equity analyst compensation is related to debt 
or M&A underwriting. We find that larger equity underwriting deals are associated with larger 
rewards, but there is no evidence that analysts are paid more for deals involving new (as opposed 
to existing “relationship”) clients. 
Our findings also indicate that analysts are rewarded for profitable stock 
recommendations, but the effect is delayed and economically significant only if it generates 
visibility in the WSJ’s annual stock-picking report. Recognition rather than underlying stock-
picking performance seems to account for much of the WSJ effect. Also, tests indicate that the 
compensation rewards for superior recommendation performance are received in the period in 
which the WSJ’s awards are announced, not the preceding year when then the superior 
performance occurred. 
  Finally, analysts who cover large portfolios earn significantly more than analysts who 
cover smaller portfolios. This factor appears to arise primarily from more talented analysts being 
matched to economically important industries or stocks and receiving higher pay for their ability.  
Given that annual compensation captures only a portion of total analyst incentives, we 
examine the characteristics of analysts who likely were “fired” from our sample bank (i.e.,      
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moved to lower-status banks or brokerages, or exited I/B/E/S). Consistent with prior literature, 
we find that “fired” analysts have large relative forecast errors in their final full year of 
employment. This finding, taken in conjunction with the lack of association between 
compensation and forecast accuracy, suggests that analysts’ forecasting incentives resemble a 
Mirrlees contract. Under a normal range of forecast outcomes there is no relation between 
forecast performance and compensation within banks, but extremely negative forecasting 
outcomes are associated with increased probability of dismissal. This finding is important in light 
of recent growth in the number of forecast-accuracy-based analyst turnover studies (e.g., Ke and 
Yu [2006], Ertimur et al. [2008], Call et al. [2009], and Pandit et al. [2009]), as it suggests that 
researchers are looking in the right place, but should be careful when generalizing their 
inferences to discussions of analyst bonuses, as some have done. 
Our findings suggest several avenues for future research. First, more research on client-
ratings seems warranted. For example, how are client ratings affected by the quality of analysts’ 
industry and firm analyses, ability to provide access to corporate managers, and responsiveness 
to client questions? Similarly, what is the relation between client votes, brokerage-level trading 
volume in covered stocks, and commission revenues? Second, given that the WSJ star premium 
appears to, and the II star premium not to, reflect visibility in the media, future research on 
incentives  for  analysts  to  generate  public  recognition  and  visibility  also  seems  warranted. 
Finally, future research could examine how the compensation practices at banks vary depending 
on the sources of funding for research. For example, how are analysts compensated at brokerage 
firms  and  lower-status  banks  at  which  investment-banking  opportunities  are  less  prevalent? 
Similarly, how effective was the Global Settlement in limiting the degree to which compensation 
is tied to banking deals?      
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FIGURE 1 
Sell-side Analysts’ Total Compensation (in 2005 dollars)  
 
This figure, based on a total of 609 analyst-year observations, plots total real compensation for all I/B/E/S-listed, U.S. sell-side analysts at a major financial institution 
during the years 1988-2005. Total compensation equals salary plus bonus. Compensation data were inflation-adjusted using CPI data from the Federal Reserve 
Economic Database (FRED). 
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FIGURE 2 
Sell-side Analysts’ Salary and Bonus Compensation (in 2005 dollars) 
 
 
 
This figure, based on a total of 609 analyst-year observations, plots real salary and bonus compensation for all I/B/E/S-listed, U.S. sell-side analysts at a major 
financial institution during the years 1988-2005. Compensation data were inflation-adjusted using CPI data from the Federal Reserve Economic Database 
(FRED). Median salary (bonus) is denoted by the dashed (solid) line. Vertical bars denote the inter-quartile range (i.e., first and third quartiles) of the salary and 
bonus distributions.      
 
34 
 
FIGURE 3 
Sell-side Analysts’ Compensation and Capital Market Activity 
 
 
This figure plots the relation between mean sell-side analyst compensation and capital market activity. The sample consists of all I/B/E/S-listed, U.S. sell-side 
analysts at a major financial institution during the years 1988-2005. Total compensation equals salary plus bonus. Compensation data were inflation-adjusted 
using CPI data from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED). Capital market activity is measured using the Baker and Wurgler [2006] index, which 
captures a variety of capital market activity signals including banking-related variables (such as IPO volume, first day IPO returns, and equity share in new 
issues) and commission-related variables (such as average monthly turnover on NYSE-listed stocks).      
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TABLE 1 
The Determinants of Analyst Compensation 
    Coefficient estimates (p-values) 
    Model 1:  Model 2:  Model 3: 
      "Within Analyst"  "Between 
Analyst" 
   Pred.  Pooled  Fixed-Effects  Cross-Sectional 
Institutional Investor "All-Star"  +  0.476 
***  0.145 
***  0.736 
*** 
    (<.001)    (0.003)    (<.001)   
Log (lagged market capitalization of portfolio)  +  0.178 
***  0.069 
***  0.185 
*** 
    (<.001)    (0.012)    (<.001)   
Investment banking contribution ($ mill)  +  0.070 
***  0.058 
***  0.102 
*** 
    (<.001)    (<.001)    (<.001)   
WSJ star stock-picker  +  0.209 
***  0.104 
**  0.518 
* 
    (0.009)    (0.042)    (0.059)   
Average relative forecast accuracy score  +  0.001    0.000    -0.001   
    (0.654)    (0.852)    (0.806)   
Number of forecast revisions  +  0.000    0.001    -0.002   
    (0.717)    (0.288)    (0.469)   
Number of initiations  +  -0.005    0.006    0.013   
    (0.610)    (0.417)    (0.575)   
Analyst experience  +  0.000    0.019 
**  0.007   
    (0.996)    (0.038)    (0.481)   
Lagged Baker and Wurgler [2006] index  +  0.369 
***  0.310 
***  0.395 
** 
    (<.001)    (<.001)    (0.028)   
                
Number of observations    401  374  116 
Adjusted R-square     0.45  0.83  0.53 
 
* , 
**, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively (based on a two-tailed t-test). 
 
This table reports compensation response coefficients for analysts employed by a high-status investment bank 
during the years 1994-2005. Significance levels (reported in parentheses) are based on heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustered by analyst and year, and test the null hypothesis that the respective coefficient is zero 
(Petersen [2009]). Model 3 is based on the mean value of each variable across all years during which an analyst 
was employed by the sample firm. Because this “between-analyst” cross-sectional model includes only one 
observation per analyst, we report significance levels based on White’s [1980] heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors. The dependent variable is the natural log of total compensation. All variables are defined in Panel A of 
the Appendix.     
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TABLE 2 
Comparing Alternate Measures of Earnings Forecast Performance: Standardized Pay-for-Accuracy Coefficients 
    Annual Metrics     Quarterly Metrics 
Panel A: Full Sample 1988-2005 
  Pred. 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Estimate  p-value    
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Estimate  p-value 
             
Absolute Accuracy:             
-(Average undeflated absolute forecast error)  +  0.006  0.812    -0.002  0.932 
-(Average price-deflated forecast error)  +  0.005  0.854    0.021  0.359 
             
Relative Accuracy:             
Average relative forecast accuracy score  +  0.031  0.283    0.000  0.985 
-(Average PMAFE)  +  0.022  0.457    -0.004  0.870 
-(Average PSAFE)  +  0.029  0.307     -0.008  0.753 
 
 
 
Panel B: WSJ EPS Sample 1994-2001  
Pred. 
Standardized Coefficient 
Estimate  p-value 
WSJ star EPS forecaster  +  0.046  0.681 
 
* , 
**, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively (based on a two-tailed t-test). 
 
Panel A reports standardized pay-for-accuracy coefficients for a variety of forecast accuracy indices commonly used in 
the sell-side analyst literature. Each standardized pay-for-accuracy coefficient, β, is obtained by estimating the following 
fixed-effect regression on the 1988-2005 sample (N = 567):  
-1 . ( ) ( . ) ( . ) it i it t it Std ln Compensation Std Accuracy Index Std BakerWurgler          
Std. ln(Compensation) is the natural logarithm of analyst compensation rescaled to have a mean of zero and standard 
deviation of one. Std. Baker Wurgler is the Baker and Wurgler [2006] market activity index rescaled to have a mean of 
zero and standard deviation of one. Std. Accuracy Index is the chosen forecast accuracy index averaged over all stocks 
within analyst i’s portfolio in year t rescaled to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. To be included in the 
annual metrics, an annual EPS forecast must be made between 90 and 360 days before the earnings announcement, and 
the earnings announcement must occur within the compensation evaluation period. Each firm can contribute at most one 
forecast to the annual accuracy metric. To be included in the quarterly metrics, a one-quarter ahead EPS forecast must be 
made between 5 and 30 days before the quarterly earnings announcement, and the earnings announcement must occur 
within the compensation evaluation period. Each firm can contribute, at most, four forecasts (one for each quarter) to the 
quarterly accuracy metric. Additional details on the forecast accuracy indices are provided in the variable definition table 
in Panel B of the Appendix.  
 
Panel B reports the standardized pay-for-accuracy coefficient for an additional variable. WSJ star EPS forecaster is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the analyst was named one of the “Best on the Street” earnings forecasters by the Wall 
Street Journal in year t, and zero otherwise.  
 
Significance levels are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by analyst and year, and test the null 
hypothesis that the respective coefficient is zero (Petersen [2009]).      
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TABLE 3 
Comparing Alternate Measures of Stock-Picking Performance: Pay-for-Performance Coefficients 
     Fixed-Effect Coefficient Estimates (p-value)    
   Pred.  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
WSJ star stock-picker  +  0.148 
***              0.134 
** 
    (0.008)                (0.015)   
Average annualized return  +      0.066 
***          0.050 
** 
        (<.001)            (0.049)   
Market-adjusted BLT [2007] portfolio alpha  +          0.053 
***      0.031   
            (0.001)        (0.161)   
Four-factor-adjusted BLT [2007] portfolio alpha  +              -0.008    -0.059 
* 
                (0.803)    (0.060)   
                       
Controlling for Baker and Wurgler [2006] index    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controlling for other determinants    No  No  No  No  No 
                       
Number of observations    339  339  339  339  339 
Adjusted R-square    0.78  0.79  0.79  0.78  0.79 
                       
  * , 
**, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively (based on a two-tailed t-test). 
 
This table reports pay-for-stock-picking-performance sensitivities for analysts employed by a high-status investment bank during the years 1995-2005. This period 
was chosen because I/B/E/S recommendation data became available in 1994, and to ensure consistency with the WSJ ratings, which are based on lagged stock-
picking performance. Significance levels (reported in parentheses) are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by analyst and year, and test the 
null hypothesis that the respective coefficient is zero (Petersen [2009]). The dependent variable is the natural log of total compensation expressed in real (2005-
equivalent) terms. The stock-picking performance indices are defined in Panel C of the Appendix. 
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TABLE 4 
Comparison with Compensation Practices at Another Top-Tier Bank 
  Fixed-Effects Coefficient Estimates (p-values) 
          Difference 
   Pred.  Firm 1  Firm 2  Firm 2 - Firm 1 
Institutional Investor "All Star"  +  0.237 
***  0.248 
***  0.011   
    (0.002)    (<.001)   (0.905)   
Log(lagged market capitalization of portfolio)  +  0.076 
**  0.049 
*  -0.027   
    (0.033)    (0.060)   (0.540)   
Investment banking contribution ($ mill)  +  0.034 
**  0.033 
***  -0.001   
    (0.015)    (<.001)   (0.953)   
Average relative forecast accuracy score  +  0.001    -0.001   -0.002   
    (0.246)    (0.308)   (0.129)   
Number of forecast revisions  +  0.001    -0.001   -0.002   
    (0.630)    (0.344)   (0.327)   
Number of initiations  +  0.000    0.001   0.001   
    (0.973)    (0.910)   (0.967)   
Analyst experience  +  -0.004    0.063 
***  0.067 
*** 
    (0.746)    (<.001)   (0.002)   
Lagged Baker and Wurgler [2006] index  +  0.338 
***  0.249 
**  -0.089   
    (<.001)    (0.035)   (0.492)   
               
Number of observations    173  240   
Adjusted R-square     0.79  0.85    
 
  * , 
**, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively (based on a two-tailed t-test). 
 
This table compares the compensation practices of our primary sample firm (Firm 1) with those of another top-tier 
investment bank (Firm 2) for the years 1988-1993. This period was chosen based on the availability of data for Firm 
2. Significance levels (reported in parentheses) are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by 
analyst and year, and test the null hypothesis that the respective coefficient is zero (Petersen [2009]). The dependent 
variable is the natural log of total compensation. All variables are defined in Panel A of the Appendix. 
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APPENDIX 
Variable Definitions 
 
For all variables, the subscript i refers to analyst i, the subscript j to stock j, and the subscript t to 
year t, defined as the period from December 1, t-1, to November 30, t. 
 
Panel A: Primary Variables 
 
Variable  Definition 
Ln(Compensation)it    Analyst i’s total compensation (salary + bonus) for year t, 
expressed in real (2005-equivalent) dollars (sources: proprietary 
compensation file, Federal Reserve Economic Database). 
 
Institutional Investor “All-
Star”it 
An indicator variable equal to one if analyst i was named an 
“All-American” in the October year t issue of Institutional 
Investor magazine, zero otherwise (source: Institutional 
Investor). 
 
Log(lagged market 
capitalization of portfolio)it 
For each of the j stocks in analyst i’s portfolio during year t we 
measure the market capitalization on December 1, t-1 (i.e., at the 
beginning of the performance evaluation period). We then sum 
these amounts across the Jit securities in analyst i’s portfolio to 
estimate the lagged aggregate market capitalization of analyst i’s 
year t portfolio and take the natural logarithm (sources: CRSP, 
I/B/E/S, Federal Reserve Economic Database). 
Investment banking 
contribution ($ mill)it 
The estimated equity underwriting fees received by the sample 
bank from all firms covered by analyst i in year t, expressed in 
real (2005-equivalent) dollars. For deals in which the bank was a 
book-runner, fees are estimated as 
Management Fee
# of Book-runners
+
Underwriting Fee + Selling Concession
# of Syndicate Members
 .  
For deals in which the bank was not a book runner, fees are 
estimated as 
Underwriting Fee + Selling Concession
# of Syndicate Members
 (sources: 
SDC, I/B/E/S, Federal Reserve Economic Database). 
WSJ star stock-pickerit  An indicator variable equal to one if analyst i was named one of 
the “Best on the Street” stock-pickers by the Wall Street Journal 
in year t, and zero otherwise (source: the Wall Street Journal). 
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APPENDIX – Continued 
 
Variable  Definition 
Average relative forecast 
accuracy scoreit 
The average accuracy of analyst i’s earnings forecasts in year t.  
For each of the Jit firms covered by analyst i in year t we 
compute relative accuracy using the following formula: 
1
100 100
ijt
jt
Rank
I

 , where Ijt is the number of analysts 
following firm j in year t and Rankijt is analyst i’s rank relative to 
all other analysts covering firm j in year t based on absolute 
forecast errors. See Figure A.1 for the timing and computation of 
absolute forecast errors (source: I/B/E/S). 
Number of forecast 
revisionsit 
The number of annual EPS forecasts issued between 90 and 360 
days before the earnings announcement date (source: I/B/E/S). 
 
Number of initiationsit  The number of new firms covered by analyst i in year t.   
Following McNichols and O’Brien [1997], we exclude 
initiations issued within the first six months of an analyst’s 
appearance in I/B/E/S (source: I/B/E/S). 
 
Analyst experienceit  The number of years that an analyst has appeared in I/B/E/S 
(source: I/B/E/S). 
 
Baker and Wurgler [2006] 
indext-1 
The lagged value of the Baker and Wurgler [2006] activity 
index, which captures a variety of capital market activity signals 
including banking related variables (such as IPO volume, first 
day IPO returns, and equity share in new issues) and 
commission-related variables (such as average monthly turnover 
on NYSE-listed stocks) (source: Baker and Wurgler). 
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APPENDIX – Continued 
 
Panel B: Additional Forecast Accuracy Variables (Table 2) 
 
For all variables, Actualjt is the actual EPS announced by firm j during evaluation year t; for the 
annual (quarterly) measures, Forecastijt is the last EPS forecast issued by analyst i for company j 
between 90 and 360 days (5 and 30) before the announcement of Actualjt; Jit is the number of 
stocks covered by analyst i during year t; Ijt is the number of analysts following stock j in year t; 
and
1
1
jt I
jt ijt jt
i jt
Actual Forecast Actual Forecast
I 
    . 
 
Variable  Definition 
Average undeflated 
absolute forecast 
errorit 
1
1
it J
jt ijt
j it
Actual Forecast
J 
 
 (source: I/B/E/S). 
 
Average price-
deflated forecast 
errorit    1 1
1
it J
jt ijt
j it jt
Actual Forecast
JP  

 , where Pjt-1 is firm j’s stock price 
measured at the beginning of the evaluation period (source: I/B/E/S, 
CRSP). 
Average DAFEit   
1
1
it J
jt ijt jt
j it
Actual Forecast Actual Forecast
J 
     (source: I/B/E/S). 
 
Average PMAFEit 
1
1
it J
jt ijt jt
j it jt
Actual Forecast Actual Forecast
J Actual Forecast 
   

  
  (source: I/B/E/S) 
 
Average PSAFEit 
  1
1
.
it J
jt ijt jt
j it jt
Actual Forecast Actual Forecast
J Std Dev Actual Forecast 
   

 

  (source: I/B/E/S) 
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APPENDIX – Continued 
 
Panel C: Additional Stock-Picking Performance Variables (Table 3) 
 
Variable  Definition 
Average 
annualized  
return i,t-1 
The annualized return to buy and strong-buy recommendations computed 
using the method employed by the sample bank (source: I/B/E/S, CRSP). 
BLT1: Market-
adjusted BLT 
[2007] portfolio 
alphait-1 
 
and 
 
BLT2: Four-
factor-adjusted 
BLT [2007] 
portfolio alpha it-1 
The long-window calendar-time “market-adjusted” and “four-factor-
adjusted” alpha obtained using the methodology in Barber, Lehavy, and 
Trueman [2007].   
 
To implement their approach, we create a portfolio of buy/strong-buy 
recommendations and estimate daily returns to this portfolio using the 
daily rebalancing technique described in BLT. We then estimate each 
analyst’s abnormal stock picking performance for a given year as the 
intercept, αit, from the following daily time-series regressions:   
(BLT1)   ()
d fd md fd d
it t it it t t it r r r r          
(BLT2)   ()
d fd md fd d d d d
it t it it t t it t it t it t it r r r r s SMB h HML w WML            , 
where 
d
it r  is the portfolio return on day d for analyst i in year t; 
fd
t r is the 
CRSP daily risk-free return on day d in year t; 
md
t r is the daily return on the 
CRSP value-weighted market index; 
d
t SMB is the return on day d in year t 
of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a value-
weighted portfolio of big stocks; 
d
t HML is the return on day d of year t of a 
value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks minus the return 
on a value-weighted portfolio of low book-to-market stocks;  
d
t WML is the return on day d of year t on a value-weighted portfolio of 
stocks with high recent returns minus the return on a value-weighted 
portfolio of stocks with low recent returns.   
 
To facilitate comparability with the Average annualized return metric 
employed by the sample bank, alphas are multiplied by 365 (source: 
I/B/E/S, CRSP, Ken French’s website). 
 
 